Iler reviews the safety file
I think we all appreciate that those who fly are, for the most part, careful and cautious in how they fly into the Island Airport. No one is suggesting that is not the case.
At the Island Airport, the presence of the numerous pilot cautions – including high-rise buildings, numerous birds, and frewquent fog - suggests that there is a higher level of risk present. In large part, that risk is addressed by informing pilots of the risks, causing them to exercise greater care, but they do nevertheless increase risk of a serious accident.
The runway length must also add risk – the longer the runway, the greater the margin of safety in the event something goes wrong. The longest runway at the Island Airport, and the only one that is able to handle the Q400, is 1220 metres long. A fully loaded Q400 requires 1402 metres for take off and landing, almost 200 metres more than the longest runway, according to the manufacturer’s specifications. While Porter insists that that runway at the Island Airport is adequate for the Q400 because it does not fly the aircraft fully loaded, others disagree:
**A Horizon Air Q400 carrying 76 passengers went off the runway and 50 feet into the grass at Washington’s Bellingham International Airport on August 16, 2009. The runway at the Bellingham Airport is 6701 feet (2042 meters) long - 2700 feet longer than the Island Airport’s longest runway.
**A WestJet Airlines Ltd. plane skidded off a runway at Ottawa's International Airport when it came in to land late on Feb 17, 2008. Flight 846 from Calgary to Ottawa "exited beyond the runway" after it touched down and came to rest in snow in open space at the end of the tarmac.
With deep water at each end of the Island airport runway, the risk of loss of life IS real. As Toronto Police Sgt. Eric Goodwin said, referring to the Cessna that slid off the Island airport last Friday night, the situation would have been worst if the Cessna had rolled another 45 metres and ended up in the dark lake:
“Thank goodness they didn’t end up in the water,” he said. “That would have been another situation entirely.”
3. Runway end safety areas
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An Air France flight 358 on August 2, 2005 departed the end of the runway at Pearson at a groundspeed of approximately 80 knots and came to rest in a ravine. The Canadian Transportation Safety Board, in its statement releasing its Report on this crash (found at http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2005/a05h0002/a05h0002_sec1.asp), stated: Since the Air France accident in Toronto, 10 large aircraft have gone off runways around the world in bad weather. "This is an unacceptable risk," said Wendy Tadros, Chair of the TSB. She went on to add, "We believe more must be done to ensure aircraft will always touch down safely so passengers don't get hurt.” If that had occurred at the Island Airport, the aircraft would have plunged into water deep enough to result in numerous fatalities. In a similar accident at Pearson in 1978, an Air Canada jet ran into the steep ravine leading down to Etobicoke Creek, killing two people and seriously injuring 47 others. An investigation into that accident found the "ravine beyond the overrun area left no additional margin for error and contributed to a high casualty rate." As the CTSB Report notes, in section 1.10.10, In 1999, ICAO elevated the "Recommended Practice" of a runway end safety area (RESA) length of 295 feet (90 m) to the status of a standard and incorporated a recommended practice of a RESA length of 780 feet (240 m).As a result of the change in status in the ICAO specification, Canada filed the difference to ICAO in accordance with the contractual agreement within the Chicago Convention; therefore, a RESA is still not required in Canada. The U.S. RESA standard (see section 1.10.11 of the Report) requires a RESA of 1,000 feet (or 300 meters), or, where that is not possible, the use of an engineered material arresting system (EMAS) to provide a level of safety that is generally equivalent to a full RESA - a standard EMAS installation extends 600 feet (or 167 meters) from the end of a runway. Transport Canada has ignored a much earlier similar recommendation for a 300 meter RESA, arising out of a coroner’s inquest into a similar 1978 crash resulting in 2 fatalities and 47 serious injuries. Runway end safety areas at the Island Airport are only 91 metres in the east and only 85 meters in the west. These cannot be lengthened. They are well short of International (240 meters)and U.S. (300 meters) standards. The CTSB Report recommended that, for an adequate margin of safety, there should be a 300 meter RESA at the end of runways, or a sufficient EMAS. 4. Emergency Access Supporters of the proposed bridge to the Island Airport insisted that the airport would not be safe without the bridge. In a press release on October 16, 2003, then Port Authority CEO Lisa Raitt stated: “The fixed link is a public safety issue. The need for a bridge to get emergency equipment to the airport quickly was identified by an intergovernmental committee almost 10 years ago." said Ms. Raitt. "In the event of an emergency, it could take up to two hours to get the appropriate equipment over to the island and that's not acceptable." When the bridge was cancelled, airport expansion continued notwithstanding. Where is the study that contradicts the study Ms. Raitt was referring to? 5. Bird Strikes |
According to the Bird Strike Committee, established by the U.S. government, and the airline industry, over 195 people have been killed worldwide (and property damage incurred exceeding $600 million to U.S. aircraft) as a result of bird and other wildlife strikes since 1988 (see http://www.birdstrike.org/birds.htm). The accounts there of serious incidents are chilling.
Porter aircraft were involved in numerous bird strikes in 2007 - two in Halifax, one in each of Montreal and Ottawa, and a disproportionate seventeen at the Toronto Island Airport. There were five just in the month of June 2009.
Pilot cautions for the Island Airport confirm this risk: “Extensive bird activity on aerodrome.”
The alarming frequency of bird strikes at the Toronto Island Airport, as compared to other airports that Porter flies into, suggests strongly that the margin of safety for flights in and out of the Toronto Island Airport is insufficient, due to the “extensive bird activity”.
6. Transport Canada
Transport Canada was severely criticized in the judicial inquiry into the 1989 Dryden crash. Judge Virgil Moshansky’s report concluded budget cuts at Transport Canada combined with deregulation of the airline industry were the root causes that led to the crash of an Air Ontario jet just after takeoff.
The Globe and Mail on January 17, 2008 stated, in an editorial in relation to regulation of the nuclear industry:
“Without proper safeguards in place, one mistake can have horrific consequences. And those safeguards can be provided only by an independent watchdog able to stand up to private and public interests alike.”
This applies with equal force to the aviation industry - Transport Canada has been such an avid supporter of both Bombardier’s aviation division, which manufactures the Q400, and the Island Airport, that it is virtually impossible to rely on it to ensure sufficient safeguards. We need a dedicated and fiercely independent agency in place.

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