Gus,

 I am confused by your response to Shirley Bush's posting. You say you are concerned about the "health, safety, and quality of life (noise, air etc pollution) for all waterfront residents, not preservation of the island lifestyle for the very few."  Who are these "very few"? If you're referring to Island residents, I suggest you re-read Shirley's post. She argues for safeguarding the Toronto Island for tourists, families, amusement park users - basically ALL visitors to the Island - a far more inclusive group than waterfront residents (which, by the way, includes those who live on the Island).

Kathleen

Dear Shirley

Your comments reek of the very same elitism and self-protectionist stance of which you are accusing the airport proponents.

The issue, for me, is health, safety, and quality of life (noise, air etc pollution) for all waterfront residents, not preservation of the island lifestyle for the very few.

Gus

For immediate release: Close Call at Island Airport Illustrates Dangers of Short Runway

On March 1, Porter flight POE125 from Toronto’s Island Airport to Newark, with 30 people on board, declared an emergency as a result of a hydraulic leak in the landing gear system.
While it initially intended to return to the Island Airport, it became apparent that the runway was too short to handle the emergency landing, and the flight was diverted to Pearson, where it landed safely, with emergency crews standing by.
The story, from the March 9, 2010 Aviation Herald, is attached, along with the Transport Canada report of the incident.
From Transport Canada’s report:
"Maintenance staff suggested that the aircraft return to the [Island] airport. The flight crew were returning the aircraft to the airport and configured the aircraft for landing by lowering the landing gear. … A review of the QRH procedures for a #2 hydraulic system failure indicated that a 1.85 Landing Distance Factor was to be added to the landing distance required. Based on this information, the aircraft was diverted to Toronto (Lester B. Pearson) International Airport and an emergency was declared [our emphasis].
While we are thankful there was no injury or worse, if this had not been caught when it was, and a landing attempted at the Island Airport, the results could have been very different.
The Island Airport has one runway usable by Porter’s Q400. It is substantially shorter than the recommended minimum for Q400 aircraft, according to its manufacturer. While Porter has chosen to fly at less than full capacity in an effort to address this issue, the available margin of safety is certainly reduced further.
The runway end safety areas for that runway only 91 metres in the east and only 85 metres in the west.
890 Yonge St, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4W 3P4
The Air France flight 358 crash at Pearson in 2005 departed the end of the runway at a groundspeed of approximately 80 knots and came to rest in a ravine.
If that had occurred at the Island Airport, the aircraft would have plunged into water deep enough to result in numerous fatalities.
As noted in today’s Globe report,
Major runways at Canadian airports are still too short – increasing the risk of planes overshooting the runway like the Air France jet that crashed and burned five years ago at Toronto's Pearson International Airport, the Transportation Safety Board is warning.
In a blast against government inaction, the independent federal body said its recommendation for the creation of 300-metre safety areas at the end of major runways has been ignored by Ottawa and the country's big airports.
Even worse, the board said, the government is only consulting the aviation industry on the addition of a 150-metre safety area, or half of the length determined to be necessary after the 2005 Air France crash in Toronto.
In an interview, Transportation Safety Board chair Wendy Tadros said the process is “taking too long” seeing as how planes that overshoot runways represent one of the biggest problems facing the aviation industry.
“Somewhere in the world, about once a month, a large aircraft will run off the end of a runway in bad weather. It's a persistent problem,” Ms. Tadros said.

For further information:

Aviation Herald story, "Incident: Porter DH8D near Toronto on Mar 1st 2010, hydraulics leak":
http://avherald.com/h?article=4286ab02


The March 1 flight of POE 125 is documented at:
http://flightaware.com/live/flight/POE125/history/20100301/1513Z/CYTZ/KEWR


The following is from Transport Canada’s Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) :
Cadors Number:
2010O0410
Reporting Region:
Ontario
Occurrence Information
Occurrence Type:
Incident
Occurrence Date:
2010-03-01
Occurrence Time:
1605 Z
Day Or Night:
day-time
Fatalities:
0
Injuries:
0
Occurrence Location:
en-route from CYTZ to KEWR
Province:
Ontario
Country:
CANADA
Reported By:
NAV CANADA
AOR Number:
116622-V1
TSB Class Of Investigation:
5
TSB Occurrence No:
A10O0036
Flight #:
POE125
Aircraft Category:
Aeroplane
Country of Registration:
CANADA
Make:
DEHAVILLAND - CAN
Model:
DHC 8 402
Year Built:
2006
Engine Make:
PRATT & WHITNEY-CAN
Engine Model:
PW150A
Engine Type:
Turbo prop
Gear Type:
Land
Phase of Flight:
Cruise
Damage:
Unknown
Owner:
PORTER AIRLINES INC.
Operator:
PORTER AIRLINES INC. (15266)
Operator Type:
Commercial
Event Information
Declared emergency/priority
Diversion
Hydraulic problem
Other operational incident
Detail Information
User Name:
Donaldson, John
Date:
2010-03-02
890 Yonge St, Suite 700, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4W 3P4
Further Action Required:
No
O.P.I.:
Commercial & Business Aviation
Narrative:
The Porter Airlines Inc. de Havilland DHC-8-402 aircraft (operating as flight POE125) had departed on a scheduled IFR flight from Toronto (Billy Bishop) Toronto City Airport (CYTZ) to Newark (Liberty) International Airport, NJ (U.S.A.) (KEWR). The aircraft was en-route when the flight crew declared an emergency due to hydraulic problems. The aircraft diverted to Toronto (LBPIA) (CYYZ) where it landed on runway 33L at 1627Z without incident. ARFF services responded for the landing. Ops. impact -- unknown.
User Name:
Donaldson, John
Date:
2010-03-10
O.P.I.:
Commercial & Business Aviation
Narrative:
UPDATE Supplemental information received from T.S.B. Daily Notification [#A10O0036]: The Porter Airlines Inc. Bombardier DHC-8-402 aircraft (C-GLQC, operating as flight POE125) was climbing through 7,000 feet ASL when the flight crew was approached by the cabin Flight Attendant who reported a strange sound in the cabin. The Flight Attendant identified the sound as a motor that was constantly operating. The flight crew assumed it was the Power Transfer Unit (PTU) and continued with the flight. Shortly thereafter, the #2 hydraulic pressure dropped down to 25% of its normal operating value. The flight crew contacted company maintenance and asked for assistance in the evaluation of the fault. Maintenance staff suggested that the aircraft return to the airport. The flight crew were returning the aircraft to the airport and configured the aircraft for landing by lowering the landing gear. The flight crew received a down and locked indication but also noticed that the #2 hydraulic fluid quantity was indicating 0%. A review of the QRH procedures for a #2 hydraulic system failure indicated that a 1.85 Landing Distance Factor was to be added to the landing distance required. Based on this information, the aircraft was diverted to Toronto (Lester B. Pearson) International Airport and an emergency was declared. The aircraft performed an uneventful landing on runway 33R with ARFF standing by. Due to the lack of the #2 hydraulics, the flight crew steered the aircraft by using differential brake pressure and engine power. Maintenance staff determined that the Power Transfer Unit (PTU) was draining fluid from the PTU drive drain and depleting fluid in the #2 hydraulic system. Maintenance staff replaced the PTU and performed the functional tests as per the AMM. They also replaced the filters and flushed the system. A successful flight test was conducted and the aircraft was returned to service. No further hydraulic faults have been reported.

I would remind everyone doing napkin NEF calculations re:number of slots that the number is flexible. Remember: Quieter airplanes = more slots, lower exposure on the ground due to changed approach angles = more slots.

The agreement allows Dash 8 operations constrained by NEF 25 and a curfew.

As long as that simple fact is not accepted by CAIR all the other positive changes that could come to mitigate community concern will be limited by the fact that there is little engagement back and forth due to antagonism.

Kyle

The second item in this series looked at the level of commercial activity permissible and the number of slots available at the Billy Bishop Toronto Centre Airport (BBTCA) based on the provisions of the 1983 Tripartite Agreement (Agreement).  This instalment continues the discussion of slots.  http://www.torontoport.com/PortAuthority/media_content.asp?id=439

 

The TPA’s version

 

Fact: The Tripartite Agreement does not cap slots at a hard number. Instead, it employs a Noise Exposure Forecast (“NEF”) contour model to regulate the overall frequency of aircraft activity around the BBTCA. A map of this NEF perimeter is on Page III-8 of the Jacobs Consultancy noise management study.

According to the most recent data published in the Jacobs Consultancy noise management study, the pre-established NEF contours – considered to be the “cap” of maximum allowable flight activity -- have not been reached with the current traffic.

Based on the results of a capacity study, the TPA anticipates that between 42 and 92 additional slots can be made available to commercial air carriers without breaching the maximum NEF contour. These slots will be determined and allocated by a slot co-ordinator in accordance with International best practices through a careful and transparent process taking into account Tripartite Agreement restrictions, community impact, safety and noise emissions.

 

The CommunityAIR version

 

The TPA posted the above on their website in response to the claim that the Tripartite Agreement limits commercial slots at the BBTCA to a total of 97.  The 97-slot total came from Transport Canada.  As a short history of the number of permissible slots shows, the number varies.

 

A July 21, 1998 Transport Canada memo sets the number of slots at 97 based on commercial service using the Dash 8-100 series aircraft, a smaller plane than the Q400.

 

The December 2001 Sypher:Mueller Report prepared by the TPA’s consultants http://www.torontoport.com/PortAuthority/uploadedFiles/Airport/News/Report_Items/TCCAFinaDec.pdf sets the number of available slots at 112.

 

In 2005, consultant Pryde Schropp McComb, in a report to potential Porter’s investors, claimed the NEF contour allowed for 167 available slots.

 

In 2006, Roger Tassé’s released his extensively researched report on the TPA.

http://www.tc.gc.ca/policy/report/acf/torontoportauthority/e.htm  It identified the number of available slots at 120.

 

Why the confusion over the number of available slots?

 

One possible answer is Transport Canada’s (TC) errors of commission or omission. 

 

The Agreement charges Transport Canada with supplying the TPA and/or City of Toronto with “actual NEF Contours based on the 95 percentile level of aircraft movements during the immediately preceding calendar year.”  In addition, Transport Canada is required to supply the TPA and/or the City with a revised NEF “as soon as data is available following the end of any subsequent calendar year during which the number of general aviation aircraft movements or the number of STOL aircraft movements has increased over the immediately preceding calendar year.”

 

Why has Transport Canada not complied and produced a revised NEF?  After all, since Porter Airlines began service in 2006, the number of aircraft movements has increased annually.

 

If the example of the City’s request of Transport Canada’s for helicopter flight paths is anything to go by, Transport Canada can be accused either of willfully withholding information or gross incompetence. 

 

The Agreement states that Transport Canada must establish flight paths for helicopters if annual flights exceed a certain number.  The City first wrote requesting the flight paths on March 1, 2006.  The Agreement says that Transport Canada must supply the City with the information within six months of the request.  Four years later, it appears that the helicopter flight paths have finally been established. 

 

One possible reason for the delay is the effect on the NEF.  According to the Agreement, once helicopter flight paths are established, the number of and time of flights are factored into the NEF contour, thus cutting back on the number of available commercial slots.

 

The TPA’s 212 slots is the most recent number is alluded to in their Christmas Eve bulletin.

http://www.torontoport.com/PortAuthority/notices/Toronto%20Port%20Authority%20Slot%20Bulletin%20-%202009%20Dec%2024.pdf

 A careful read of Page 2 shows that between 42 and 92 slots will be added to the existing commercial carrier operations which will utilize approximately 120 slots in the period leading up to April 2010.  Thus the total slots available under the TPA consultant’s NEF calculations is between 162 and 212.

 

To reiterate, the number of slots available under the NEF is 97 or 112 or 167 or 120 or a range between 162 and 212, depending upon the source you wish to believe.  Note that none of these sources is the City of Toronto nor are they based on data supplied to the City of Toronto.

 

With regard to the TPA’s claim, “According to the most recent data published in the Jacobs Consultancy noise management study, the pre-established NEF contours – considered to be the “cap” of maximum allowable flight activity -- have not been reached with the current traffic”, try to confirm the claim.  Download the study http://www.torontoport.com/reports/BBTCA-NoiseMgmtInterimReport-Feb2010.pdf

and search for information on the following:  maximum allowable flight activity; cap; current traffic; slots; 162; 212.  Yes, the study goes to great length to describe the methodology the consultant used but it gives no results.

 

However, mentioned above is another study, their consultant’s capacity study.  That’s where the 42 and 92 additional slots come from.  This information is not available.  Has it been presented to the City?  Are we to accept it based on the TPA’s word?  Given the TPA’s earlier dealings with the City of Toronto on the environmental assessment for the fixed link and with the U.S. Department of Transport on availability of slots for US Air on Toronto-Philadelphia flight, probably not.

 

According to the most recent data published in the Jacobs Consultancy noise management study, the pre-established NEF contours – considered to be the “cap” of maximum allowable flight activity -- have not been reached with the current traffic.

As for the TPA statement, “These slots will be determined and allocated by a slot co-ordinator in accordance with International best practices through a careful and transparent process taking into account Tripartite Agreement restrictions, community impact, safety and noise emissions”, they seem to be saying that the yet-to-be-approved additional slots are a foregone conclusion.

Bob Kotyk

 

The first item in this series looked at the admissibility of the Q400 as a permissible aircraft at the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport (BBTCA) based on the provisions of the 1983 Tripartite Agreement (Agreement) and the 1985 amendment.  This instalment also references the Agreement, within the context of the level of commercial service allowable.

 

The TPA version

Fact: The 1983 Tripartite Agreement sets out the rules, restrictions and protocols for aircraft activity and commercial service at BBTCA. Not only that, but the BBTCA hosted three different commercial carriers throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

 

The CommunityAIR Version

 

The TPA is correct.  The 1983 Tripartite Agreement sets out the rules, restrictions and protocols for aircraft activity and commercial service at BBTCA.  The Toronto Port Authority’s statement is a response to CommunityAIR’s claim that the airport was never intended to be an active commercial airport.

 

Sections of the Tripartite Agreement prohibit use of the airport for any purpose except “general aviation” and “limited commercial STOL service operations” and operations ancillary to those uses.  They define limited commercial STOL service as a service using short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft, for hire, or reward, in an operation duly licensed by the Air Transport Committee of the Canadian Transport Commission, and operating in a manner compatible with the specified capacity and capability of the airport facilities provided and in accordance with the conditions of Section 14.” 

 

Section 14 is key.  It requires the TPA to regulate the frequency of aircraft movements within an NEF contour or noise containment area.  The NEF contour is a line enveloping an area surrounding the airport.  Its position and relationship to the surrounding area is determined by a modeling formula based on factors such as the various kinds of aircraft flown and their frequency, the numbers of helicopter take-offs and landings, the number of night flights, etc.  Once the NEF contour is established, the TPA knows what level of activity is permissible. 

 

The NEF contour model gives the airport operator scheduling choices as to the kinds of aircraft and their purposes.  For example, if helicopters flying at night account for a certain amount of activity that reduces the number of commercial airline flights, the operator has the flexibility to reduce the number of helicopter flights in order to increase the number of commercial flights as long as the total number of movements stays within the NEF contour.

 

Commercial airline activity, the number of take-offs and landings, are referred to as slots.  Each take-off is a slot as is each landing.  Thus 212 slots can mean 106 take-offs and 106 landings. 

 

The TPA claims 212 slots available for commercial service under the NEF are allowable by the Agreement.  They base their claim on work done by their consultant.  However, the earliest verifiable number seen by CommunityAIR is contained in a July 21, 1998 Transport Canada memo that sets the number of slots available for commercial service at 97.

 

Defying credibility, the TPA continues to argue that doubling Transport Canada’s 97 to the TPA consultant’s 212 slots does not expand the airport into an active commercial airport.

 

As for the observation that the airport hosted three different commercial carriers throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a look at the numbers available proves CommunityAIR’s point that the TPA is expanding the airport into an active commercial airport.

 

In 1982, City Centre Airways started the first airline service using the Dash 7.  Their presence at the airport was the catalyst for the Tripartite Agreement.  Under pressure by the federal provincial and regional (Metro) governments to develop the airport for commercial purposes, City Council wanted to keep the airport a manageable mix of general and limited commercial traffic.

 

Starting in November 1983 with the purchase of Air Atonabee, mainly for its licence to fly from the airport to Ottawa, City Express soon came into being.  In 1987, passenger traffic peaked at 400,000.

 

In 1989, City Council looked for a way to stop the airport operator’s plans to triple the number of flights, from 42 to 112.  Council suggested that the airport operators cap the number of flights at 90 per day.  Air Ontario, the third commercial carrier in the 1980s and 1990s was included in the airport plans.  Air Ontario, a private company, owned 75 per cent by Air Canada and 25 per cent by the Deluce family, announced that they would begin service in April 1990. 

 

Today, the TPA claims that the airport will handle somewhere north of 1.3 million passengers and plans to allow 212 flights.  The 1.3 million passengers is three times the previous peak number set in 1987.  The 212 slots are over double the City Council cap of 90 and Transport Canada’s 97. 

 

Perhaps the TPA can explain why these greatly increased numbers don’t point to an active commercial airport, especially since they won’t reveal the details explaining how they arrived at 212 slots.

Bob Kotyk

 

  It has been almost entirely through long-time Toronto residents’ efforts for over a decade  that the Toronto Islands have been preserved as accessible only by ferry.  Throughout a succession of ‘outside’ politicians, incessant lobbyists/developers dream-schemes, and  TPA expanded airport promotion, the Islands have remained relatively untouched, protected only by the fierce intervention of citizens.  The defeat of Toronto Mayoralty candidates has even been influenced by this issue. Federal politicians have reneged on promises to follow the desire of voters..

 In addition to being unique as part of (and yet a haven from) both heavily populated and huge commercial areas of the Province’s capitol city, the charm of being accessible only by water has been vastly under-rated.  The sheer novelty amuses and delights tourists.  They throng on the ferry decks and the Islands shores to take pictures of the Toronto skyline.  There is absolutely no other comparable way to capture that view at any time of the day or season of the year, as professional photographers constantly demonstrate.  Visitors marvel at the swarms of small sailboats in the harbour.  They delight in the absence of extreme Disney-type of commercialism in the entertainment area, where families can spend an entire fun-filled day without feeling gouged and let down.  It is an utterly fascinating anachronism in big-city life.

 Its very existence is imperiled by the TPA and Porter Airlines!  They have mounted an incessant, unremitting PR campaign for 10 years!  Once again, they are promoting a fixed link to the airport, PLUS a perimeter road!  They have not learned that NO means NO. Toronto citizens do not want fixed access OR an expanded airport. 

 In 2002, former Mayor David Crombie and urban advocate Jane Jacobs joined forces with environmentalists, architects, concerned Toronto citizens and waterfront residents to oppose airport expansion as endangering safety and quality of life. Why has the TPA, with the assistance of the Federal Government, encouraged unwanted and unnecessary expansion of an airport that has always existed mainly as a semi-private shuttle for an elite downtown niche market of well-heeled businessmen, lobbyists and government employees?  Pearson is far more practical for anyone traveling from other city areas.

 I truly believe that the existence of Toronto Islands as a heritage and green oasis is in peril. At the very least, the question of greatly expanded airport and pedestrian tunnel plus a perimeter road should be included on the ballot for the next municipal election.  Since there is a Tripartite Agreement, perhaps provincial and federal politicians should be involved. Meanwhile, the TPA should be ordered immediately by the federal government to put a hold on all further TPA/Island plans and purchases in order to prevent another premature and costly fiasco like the bridge scandal.

 Shirley Bush,

On March 5, CommunityAIR’s Brian Iler posted a response tothe Toronto Port Authority’s CEO Geoffrey Wilson.  In an earlier email, Mr. Wilson charged thatCommunityAIR is spreading myths and factually incorrect information about theTPA’s airport operations.  Mr. Iler’sresponse may be read here.  http://blog.communityair.org/2010/03/05/response-to-the-tpas-myths.aspx

 

In the original email exchange between Mr. Iler and Mr.Wilson, Mr. Wilson attached a letter that appears was intended for posting onthe TPA website.  The letter contained aMyth/Fact section refuting CommunityAIR claims. The letter also contained the following, “I think we are both aware thatmany recent allegations made on the CommunityAIR blog are not factuallycorrect, and in our opinion, designed to mislead media and citizens.” 

 

Mr. Iler responded, “You statethat a number of statements made on the CommunityAIR blog are factuallyincorrect, implying that I and our organization do not care about truth. Thatis untrue and defamatory.”  Mr.Wilson’s letter did not appear on the TPA website but the TPA’s list of mythsand facts did. 

 

An examination of the first of the TPA’s facts follows.

 

The TPA version

 

Fact: Non-STOL aircraft can use the BBTCA, according toamendment of the Tripartite Agreement in 1985, provided they are approved byTransport Canada and the Canadian Transportation Agency. The Bombardier Q400used by Porter Airlines at BBTCA is a Non-STOL aircraft and has received suchapprovals.

Furthermore, commercial jet aircraft are prohibited fromusing the BBTCA under the Tripartite Agreement (the agreement governing theoperational parameters of the BBTCA signed by the TPA, federal government andthe City of Toronto).

 

 

CommunityAIR’s position

 

The Tripartite Agreement (Agreement) is a contract signed bythree parties: The City of Toronto; Transport Canada; The Toronto PortAuthority.  The Agreement allows forgeneral aviation and limited commercial STOL service operations.  Each signatory is legally bound by thedocument.  The Agreement was signed in1983.

 

Priorto 1983, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners ran the airport until its 21-yearlease ran out.  Senior levels ofgovernment wanted a STOL operation out of the airport and City Council agreedto a limited level of commercial service as detailed in the Agreement.  In 1999, the newly instituted Toronto PortAuthority took over all the Toronto Harbour Commissioners rights andobligations.

CityCentre Airways received an air operator licence for a Dash 7 service betweenToronto, Ottawa and Montreal in 1982.

 

In1985, the Agreement was amended to allow the Dash 8.  The Dash 8 at the time of the amendment wasthe 100 series, which carried 37-39passengers.  The first Dash 8-100 series plane flew on June 20,1983.  It entered airline service in 1984with NorOntair.  It was the only Dash 8in existence at the time of the amendment. It is CommunityAIR’s position that the Dash 8-100 series is the onlyDash 8 allowed under the amendment and agreement.

 

Clearly, the TPA and Transport Canada doesnot agree.  They believe the 1985amendment allows for any aircraft certified as a Dash 8 to use the airport fora limited commercial STOL service.  It ison this basis that they argue the Q400 is admissible at the airport.  Transport Canada’s position is that becausethe Q400 is a derivative of the Dash 8 and because Transport Canada and theCanadian Transportation Agency haveapproved it as such, it is admissible.

 

The facts that the Q400 is not a STOLaircraft by former Transport Minister’s own admission and that it is far largerand heavier than the Dash 8-100 series and that it has nearly twice thepassenger capacity and that it didn’t exist in 1985 don’t seem to matter.

It is almost as if Transport Canada andthe TPA are saying that the Q400 is admissible because we say it is and we backour claim on a technicality.

 

As for the TPA’s statement that the TripartiteAgreement prohibits the use of commercial jet aircraft, no one isdisputing it and their reasons for including the obvious are baffling.

 

Because theTripartite Agreement is a legal document, it would take a legal opinion to sortthe matter out.  CommunityAIR isnot a signatory to the agreement so can not challenge Transport Canada’s andthe TPA’s claim in court.  The City ofToronto is a signatory.  Unfortunately,for whatever reason, they have chosen not to protect their interests and thefuture of Toronto’s waterfront through a court ruling.

Bob Kotyk

Mr. Geoffrey Wilson,President and CEO, Toronto Port Authority (TPA), in a March 10 email, tookissue with CommunityAIR’s Brian Iler’s observation that the TPA was in breachof Section 20 of the Tripartite Agreement. 

 

DRAINAGE AND DISCHARGE OF MATERIAL

20.  The Lesseeshall not discharge, cause or permit to be discharged or

howsoever to pass into the sewer systems, storm drainsor surface drainage facilities at the demised premises, if any, or elsewhereany noxious, contaminated or poisonous substances; it being expresslyunderstood and agreed that in the event of a discharge or escape from thedemised premises of such noxious, contaminated or poisonous substances in andunder the control of the Lessee, the Lessee shall be responsible to clean up tothe satisfaction of the Lessor al no cost to the Lessor.

 

Mr. Wilson wrote, “I'm afraid your assertion about breaches of theTripartite below (Section 20) is rather incorrect.”  Before examining Mr. Wilson’s argumentthat the TPA handles de-icing contaminants in a way that does not contraveneSection 20, a little background is in order.

 

On March 21, 2002, Dr. Sheila Brasur tabled a staff reportfor the Toronto Board of Health, Management of De-icing Activities at Toronto Lester B. PearsonInternational.

http://www.toronto.ca/health/hphe/pdf/deicingactivities.pdf  The report is an update on the measures thatthe Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA) took at Pearson to mitigate thehealth and environmental effects of de-icing fluids discharged into thesanitary sewer system.

 

The report touches on the composition of the de-icing fluidsand their contaminating effects. 

“The activecomponent of aircraft de-icing or anti-icing fluids is ethylene glycol orpropylene glycol. Ethylene glycol is the active component in aircraft de-icingor anti-icing fluids used at Toronto Pearson International Airport. Althoughits toxicity is relatively low and it breaks down readily in the environment,rapid loading of large volumes of de-icing fluids into the surface water bodiescan lead to oxygen depletion, threatening the survival of aquatic life. Ethyleneglycol-based de-icing products are about 3-10 times more toxic to aquaticorganisms than pure ethylene glycol due to the presence of small amounts (about1%) of additives in the formulations. One of these is tolyltriazole, which functions as a corrosion inhibitorand a flame retardant.”

Clearly,untreated de-icing fluids are ‘noxious, contaminated or poisonous substances’.

 

 

Pearsonopened their Central De-Icing Facility (CDF) in 1998 and expanded it in1999/2000.  The facility’s purpose is tominimize the release ofcontaminants to the surrounding waterways. It does so by minimizingethylene glycol consumption and spillage as well as collecting, treating andsafely disposing of the chemical.

 

Usinga series of containment tanks and strict analysis, the CDF ensures that the Canadian Environmental ProtectionAct (CEPA) Part IV effluent guideline of 100 mg/L (i.e. 0.01%) at airports ismet before any discharge enters stormsewers.

 

As MsBrasur’s report points out, the GTAA conducts an annual review of its de-icingoperations and based on the findings endeavours to improve its operations andstormwater management plans.  The Compliance Manager for theOntario Clean Water Agency visits the facility weekly and is on 24-hour call totrouble shoot.  The GTAA  also allows Toronto Public Health to examineits facility. 

 

TheToronto Port Authority’s de-icing contaminant procedures are not quite asdetailed.  The Authority’s website http://www.torontoport.com/PortAuthority/airport_facts.aspoffers this description.  “TCCA has had a water sampling and mitigationprogramme in place since 1992. All storm water discharged into Lake Ontario isclosely monitored and tested. TCCA has created a new Glycol Containment Areawhere the run-off goes directly into storm sewers connected to Metro TorontoSanitary Sewage Network.”

 

Anothersource, the TPA’s consultant, Dillon Consulting Limited, wrote, “The Aircraftde-icing is carried out within specified areas of the terminal ramp wheresurface runoff is directed to a glycol collection system. This system ensuresthat there is no discharge to the surrounding water areas. The glycol/watermixture is discharged via the Metropolitan Toronto Sanitary Sewer system fortreatment.”  Source: Proposed Fixed Link Bridge to the TCCA, Final Ea Screening Report, P.45 Appendix A, Toronto Port Authority, August, 2003.

 

Mr. Wilson’s March 10, 2010 email doesn’t shed much more light on thematter.  He wrote, “The removal of deicing fluid does not enterthe sewer system.  Thisliquid waste or deicing fluid is collected through a series of catch basins onthe main apron which is separate from the storm water drainage sewers anddischarge areas.   From thecatch basin, the drainage flows to the Island’s sanitary treatment facility asper the Tripartite Agreement.   Sampling and analysis is conducted in order to confirm compliance withapplicable Sewer Use By-Laws.”

 

There areproblems with either Mr. Wilson’s understanding of the TPA’s handling of thede-icing fluid or with the TPA’s mitigating measures themselves.

 

For onething, there is no Island sanitary treatment facility.  By Mr. Wilson’s admission, the TPA is dumpingthe liquid waste into the sanitary sewer system.  It flows into the Ashbridges Bay facility.

 

Foranother thing, although the airport’s discharge is sampled and analyzed, thereis no indication that it is recycled or treated to meet the CEPA guideline,applicable sewer use bylaws notwithstanding.

 

Incomparing the available information on the treatment of de-icing fluid at thetwo airports, we can readily see that the GTAA has a transparent,sophisticated, effective process that invites outside scrutiny.  On the other hand, the TPA’s process remainslittle known or understood and depends on insiders and second party sources todescribe its basic workings.

 

We candraw a parallel between the TPA’s openness on its treatment of de-icing fluidand on its position on the number of slots available for commercial air carriersusing the airport.  In both cases itappears to be, ‘trust us; our consultants assure us that what we say willfly’.  As long as the TPA operates in thesame secretive manner, it will be open to charges that it’s contravening theTripartite Agreement. 

 

In the case of de-icing fluidentering the sewer system, the TPA’s word is not good enough.  The TPA must open its doors to Toronto PublicHealth and the Ontario Clean Water Agency.

Bob Kotyk

Hello All,

Thanks for the text of the curfew in the tripartite agreement as provided by Mr. Iler. It specifically states "flights" and doesn't refer to taxiing or even starting engines.

If the intent was to be as strict as "SKYWATCHER's" curfew interpretation, then the curfew should have been worded like the one in Santa Monica California where over 150000 people live within 3.2 km of the airport.

http://www.smgov.net/departments/airport/content.aspx?id=9005

Santa Monica Municipal Code 10.04.04.080 part b) states:

b). No aircraft shall be started, run-up or depart the Airport between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. Mondays through Fridays nor between 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. Saturdays and Sundays, except in case of bona fide medical or public safety emergency, with the consent of the Airport Director or, in his or her absence, the Watch Commander of the Police Department.

As you can see, this curfew explicitly restricts taxiing since they aren't even allowed to start engines prior to 0700. Precedent and past practices at the Island, notwithstanding blatant late arrivals, has been to allow taxiing during curfew hours. NOISY Engine maintenance also takes place overnight because the curfew only appears to restrict "flying" or put another way "RUNWAY" operations (i.e. landing and taking off). I agree that engine maintenance is as loud as a departing aircraft but there is no specific restriction banning it during curfew.

The Santa Monica Municipal Code is very explicit and I think CAIR should approach the TPA to include the same restrictions in the Island Airport curfew. As Porter's schedule expands to more destinations, they will be under pressure to compete with carriers from Pearson that can depart much sooner to the same airports and, as a result, will probably schedule more early departures as well as late evening arrivals.

This brings up another related point that Mr. Iler alluded to. It is his opinion that "the curfew wording would be interpreted by a judge to reflect its intended purpose." In the past, the ICAO noise averaging methodology and status of the Q400 as a DASH-8 have also been mentioned as items a judge would (could) interpret differently than the TPA. With these three issues in mind, has CAIR sought a legal and binding interpretation of these important issues OR what is preventing this from taking place?

Take Care!
Joe